Influence operations are often dismissed as low-impact and short-lived, but is that really the case? While individual campaigns may seem ineffective, their cumulative effect can reshape the information environment, erode societal resilience, and alter perceptions over time.

Authoritarian regimes see influence operations as a strategic necessity, investing heavily without questioning their value. For them, the debate isn’t whether to fund these efforts, but who, including commercial actors, can execute them most effectively.

Success in IOs is difficult to measure. If direct impact - changed minds, altered behavior remains elusive, are we missing the bigger picture? Influence operations aren’t just about persuasion; they manipulate, deceive, and corrode trust, often with long-term consequences. Should we rethink how we assess their effectiveness?

Attribution adds another layer of complexity. While governments are increasingly exposing perpetrators, does failure to act decisively undermine deterrence? If attribution is to be more than a signal, how can it drive meaningful consequences?

Finally, how should democracies inform the public? Does transparency strengthen resilience, or risk amplifying the threat? Where is the line between public interest and information warfare?